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BASQUE NATIONALISM 
William A. Douglass 
University of Nevada 
Milton da Silva 
Juniata College 
In late 1970 the trial in Spain of sixteen Basques, alleged members 
of a separatist group called ETA, provoked a series of events which 
journalists have labelled "the greatest political crisis of the Franco 
years." The events in question included a general strike in the two 
Basque provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya, imposition of a state of 
emergency in those areas, fear of a general strike in the nation, 
closure of universities, street demonstrations in Madrid and Granada, 
pleas of clemency from the Vatican, several foreign governments and a 
large number of Spain's intellectuals, and detention of many leaders 
of non-Basque political opposition groups. When the Burgos military 
tribunal handed down harsh penalties, including nine death sentences, 
the army was placed on alert and all eyes were turned upon Franco who 
alone had the power to stay the executions. In a nation-wide address 
Franco defused the situation by commuting the death penalties to long 
term imprisonment. 
It would be e rroneous to conclude from these events that the re-
latively obscure Basque nationalist movement is currently striking a 
responsive chord throughout non-Basque sectors of Spanish society. In 
fact it would be more accurate to state that a groundswell of popular 
support for the accused developed despite their Basque nationalist 
pretensions. The trial at Burgos simply served as a convenient 
cause celebre for the spectrum of Spanish opposition groups. However, 
if the recent events cannot be interpreted as general approbation for 
Basque nationalist aims, it is equally evident that Franco's defusing 
of the immediate crisis accomplished little for the ongoing governmen-
tal effort to cope with the Basques' challenge to centralist authority 
within Spain's political life. Furthermore, it is likely that Basque 
nationalism will continue to grow and that the level of violence will 
escalate. This prediction follows from a consideration of the history 
of the Basque nationalist movement. 
The Basque country straddles the French-Spanish frontier at a 
point where the western range of the Pyrenees meets the Cantabrian 
seacoast. Four of the provinces (Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, Alava, and 
Navarra) and three of the former provinces (Labourd, Basse Navarre, and 
Soule) of the present French Department of the Basse Pyrenees constit-
ute the Basque area. In terms of size, populationi, and economic im-
portance the Spanish provinces dominate with about 6/7 of the total 
land area of slightly more than 20,000 square kilometers and 10/11 of 
the total population of 2.2 million persons. l While the total land 
area is quite small (less than one hundred miles across on either an 
east-west or a north-south tangent) the broken nature of the landscape 
and the exposure to the sea provide the Basque country with a wide var-
iety of ways of life. These include pastoralism in the higher mountains, 
villages of peasant agricultur.alists in the rolling hills of the northern 
regions, large agricultural estates in the flat arid plains of the 
southernmost areas, and fishing and merchant marine activities along 
the seacoast The two Spanish Basque provinces of Vizcaya and 
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Guipuzcoa, the hotbeds of the modern Basque nationalist movement, are 
among the most highly industrialized regions of the Iberian peninsula 
and enjoy the highest rate of per capita income in Spain (Payne 1967: 
85). Bilbao, the capital city of Vizcaya, is a major financial, indus-
trial, and shipping center for the nation. Finally, in recent years 
tourism has become an important factor in the economy of the Basque area. 2 
These economic resources and activities are distributed unevenly. 
The Spanish Basque area has a diversified, broadbased economy, including 
agriculture, fishing, light and heavy industry, shipping and tourism. 
It is one of the most dynamic regional economies in Spain, which has 
meant rapid population growth as migrants from other parts of the nation 
flock to the industries of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa (Arana, J. D. 1968:13). 
This might be contrasted with the situation in France where the regional 
economy of the Basque area, based largely upon pastoralism, peasant agri-
cylture, and a short summer tourist season, is one of the weakest within 
the economic structure of the nation. 3 The French Basque area has long 
been characterized by a relatively static population (Lhande 1910). 
Basque nationalism, in its several forms ranging from the desire 
for greater Basque autonomy within the structure of the Spanish and 
French states to the aspiration for a free Euzkadi or Basque nation 
carved out of Spain and France, is a much greater challenge to Madrid 
than to Paris. The two million Spanish Basques constitute about 7% of 
the national population and in terms of Spain's GNP their importance 
far outdistances that of their relative numbers (Linz 1966 :200). 
A frequent complaint in the Spanish Basque area is that the Basque 
provinces contribute much more to the nation than they receive in return 
in the form of services. A popular Basque protest song likens Spain to a 
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cow with its muzzle in the Basque country and its udder in Madrid. In 
France the Basques constitute only about .4% of the national population 
and their economic contribution to the nation is negligible. French 
Basques receive more in the form of governmental services and family 
subsidies than they pay in taxes. Thus, Basque nationalism, both from 
the Basques' and central governments' viewpoints, is a much more serious 
issue in Spain's political life. This accounts in part, but only in part, 
for the fact that Basque nationalist action and central government re-
action to the Basque question is currently concentrated on the Spanish 
side of the frontier. 
Of the two million inhabitants of the Spanish Basque provinces only 
about 600,000 may be regarded as culturally Basque, if ability to use 
the Basque language is taken as the defining criterion (Lecuorta 1965). 
This situation is the result both of the previously mentioned influx 
of non-Basque factory workers and the historical retrogression of the 
Basque language and culture out of the southern plains and into the 
mountainous regions of the northern portion of the Basque country. 
Presently, the language is no longer spoken throughout most of 
the southernmost provinces of Alava and Navarra. These areas have 
undergone a large measure of hispanicization and are considerably 
less fertile, if not wholly sterile, ground for Basque nationalism. 
Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, the industrial bastions of northern Spain, remain 
the major staging areas for the movement. 
But who are the Basques and upon what grounds do they argue their 
claims for greater autonomy or outright nationhood? The Basque country 
has lacked political sovereignty since the Middle Ages, consequently the 
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BasCl.ues lack a political identity as recognized by the community of 
nation3. However, their claim to ethnic uniCl.ueness within the broad 
panorama of European peoples and cultures is particularly strong. The 
testimony of their language, which linguistics have as yet been unable 
to relate to any other (Gallop 1930a), their blood type frequencies 
(Levine 1967: 45), which physical anthropologists find to differ radic-
ally from those of surrounding European populations, and the evidence 
of the archaeological record, which suggests that the Basques were in 
situ in the Pyrenees well before the subsequent invasions of Western 
Europe of Indo-European speaking tribes, invasions which were to shape 
the ethnographic makeup of most of Europe as we know it today, all 
strengthen the Basques' claim to a unique ethnic identity. Not to be 
disregarded is the Basques' own awareness that they differ from other 
Spaniards and Frenchmen--an identity which leads Basque nationalists 
and Basque contrabandists alike to take the French-Spanish frontier 
lightly. It is this sense of ethnic awareness translated into poli-
tical activism which fosters the climate in which Basque nationalism 
persists. 
While modern day Basque nationalism, with a penchant in at least 
some circles to work for political separatism, is essentially a 
twentieth century phenomenon, for the ardent nationalist the historical 
antecedents of the movement are not to be reckoned in years or even 
centuries, but rather in terms of millenia. The annals of Strabo 
provide accounts of the ferocity of resistance to Roman rule by at least 
some of the mountain tribes of the present day Basque area. Basque 
resistance was equally successful against later Visigothic, Frankish 
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and Arab invaders. By the tenth century the powerful kings of Navarra 
had established and consolidated a kingdom which encompassed all of the 
present day Basque area, as well as other parts of southern France and 
northern Spain. However, with the exception of the short-lived reign 
of Sancho El Mayor from the 1000 to 1035, political organization in the 
Basque country showed a tendency for fragmentation and internecine 
warfare. 
By the twelfth century the kingdom of Navarra had been reduced to 
an area which approximates the present day Spanish province of Navarra 
and a small area of the French Basque country known as Basse Navarre. 
The present day Spanish Basque provinces of Alava and Guipuzcoa were 
under the aegis of the king of Castille and the province of Vizcaya 
had been brought within the orbit of that kingdom through a royal mar-
riage. The remaining parts of the French Basque country were passing 
successively under the control of the Frankish kings to the north, the 
kingdom of Bearn to the east, and the crown of England to the west. By 
the sixteenth century the present day French-Spanish frontier was cry-
stallized and the Basques' loss of political sovereignty was complete, 
since in 1512 the kingdom of Navarre fell to the Catholic kings and in 
1590 Basse Navarre was annexed by the French monarchy. 4 
While sixteenth-century developments signalled the end of effect-
ive Basque political sovereignty it did not mean the total loss of 
political autonomy. In both Spain and France the monarchies were not 
regarded as political overlords but rather as political allies. Local 
affairs continued to operate in terms of a set of charters, termed fueros 
in Spain and ~ in France, duly recognized by the respective central 
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governments, and which guaranteed to the Basques a large measure of home 
rule and a degree of independence even in foreign affairs (Garcia Venero 
1945). Thus in each of the provinces internal affairs were governed by 
local councils. These councils were made up of popularly elected offi-
cials thus giving the Basque area a kind of primitive peasant democracy 
in a p eriod when most of western Europe was characterized by feudal 
forms of government. When these peasant assemblies met to legislate, 
great precautions were taken to reduce the influence of the church and the 
aristocracy. Clergymen were prohibited out of hand from attending and 
lawyers were excluded on the grollilds that they might use glib oration to 
confuse issues. The local aristocracy and monarch Gould send a repre-
sentative to the proceedings but solely in the capacity of observer 
without either voice or vote. Furthermore, the king was required to 
attend personally or to send a representative to swear to uphold the 
foral privileges. Other aspects of the charters further underline the 
fact that the Basque provinces were not completely integrated politic-
ally into either Spain or France. The local councils controlled the 
budget for such internal affairs as road building and the school 
system. The Basques were free from taxation, from customs duties, and 
from conscription into the army for the purpose of fighting outside 
of the Basque area (Altamira 1949: 336). 
In some cases the Basques were treated by the central power as a 
foreign government. The Basques were allowed to establish customs 
houses along the Ebro to tariff in-coming Spanish goods. In the six-
teenth century, Basque commercial interests, along with other "foreign 
interests," were denied access to the Spanish trade with the New World 
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colonies (Gallop 1930b: 495). The court of Navarra continued to func-
tion. The Spanish crown sent a viceroy to Navarra (the only such crown 
authority outside of the New World colonies). The Spanish king Ferdin-
and VII was also known as Ferdinand II of Navarra. French Basques and 
Spanish Basques were allowed to enter into agreements with one another 
to remain neutral in wars between Spain and France. They were also 
able to send diplomatic missions to other foreign governments to nego-
tiate commercial treaties. 
This state of affairs was never totally acceptable to the central 
governments of Spain and France. However, despite several attempts 
to abrogate Basque privileges, the charters remained in effect until 
the end of the eighteenth century in France and the mid-nineteenth 
century in Spain. The French Basque fors succumbed to the centralist 
philosophy of the victors in the French Revolution. Measures which 
were more designed to undermine the power of the French aristocracy 
proved equally prejudicial to French Basque regional autonomy. While 
the measures were resisted both through oratory in Parliament and 
occasional armed resistance in the Basque c01mtryside, the French 
Basques were stripped of all their privileges and the area was itself 
incorporated into the new Department of the Basse Pyrenees with the 
seat of government being conceded to Pau, the Bearnais city to the east. 
In Spain the eighteenth century was characterized by the ascen-
sion of the Bourbon dynasty to the throne. The Bourbons were parti-
c1l1arly centralist minded and launched several political assaults 
upon Basque privileges. With the early nineteenth-century advent of 
a liberal regime in Madrid, state centralization became an overriding 
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national goal in Spain. The Basques aligned their cause of regional 
autonomy with the Church's fear of a liberal government and the frus-
trations of the followers of Don Carlos, a pretender to the Spanish 
throne. This coalition, known as the Carlists, initiated a civil war 
against Madrid. 5 The First Carlist War ended in 1839 with the defeat 
of the Carlist forces. In the subsequent treaty of Vergara, the court 
of Navarra was abolished but the Basques received a promise of respect 
for their traditional liberties. However, a rider clause to the effect 
that the fueros would be respected insofar as they did not prejudice 
Spanish constitutional unity opened the door to renewed attacks on 
Basque autonomy (Garcia Venero 1945: 94). By the 1870s the Carlists 
were again in a position to trigger a civil war. However, they went 
down to defeat and this time most of the foral privileges were simply 
abolished. 
The Basque provinces, and particularly Navarra, were the main 
staging area for Carlism and, throughout the nineteenth century, con-
stituted the backbone of the movement. This penchant for Carlism re-
flected a strong conviction on the part of the Basques that the best 
means of protecting their political autonomy was to control the reins 
of government in Madrid. If the Basques' adherence to the Carlist 
cause constituted rebellion against Madrid, this rebellion was not 
tinged with separatist overtones. In short, the two Carlist wars re-
present recourse to violence in order to effect change within the poli-
tical life of the Spanish nation. 
The two Carlist wars, which were largely fought in the Basque pro-
vinces, decimated the countryside, encumbered the population with huge 
debts in the form of war retributions, and left a standing army of 
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occupation. It also created a climate of intimidation aimed at under-
mining Basque culture through such methods as outlawing the language 
in the printed media. Therefore by the end of the nineteenth century 
Spanish Basques were faced with the fact that with stunning rapidity 
they had lost the fueros and their leadership, and their culture was 
under attack in their very homeland. 
It was out of this climate that the modern Basque nationalist 
movement was born. The movement was essentially the product of an 
urban environment and led by urban people, particularly from Bilbao, 
the capital city of Vizcaya, and San Sebastian, the capital of Guip-
uzcoa. This fact arouses curiosity when we consider that by the turn 
of' the present century both Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa were undergoing 
rapid incustrialization, a development which attracted to those pro-
vinces a large influx of' Spanish laborers. 6 Consequently, the Basques 
had become a minority group in their own urban centers and the Basque 
language was heard but rarely on the streets of Bilbao and San Sebas-
tian. Among most Basque intellectuals the language was denigrated as 
the "language of' the stable" and was never employed for literary pur-
poses or commerce, or in the school system. For example, the Basque 
provinces produced three titans of'the famous literary generation of 
1898, Miguel de Unamuno, Pio Baroja, and Ramiro de Maeztu; none of 
these men, however, wrote in Basque. So we find that by the end of the 
nineteenth century the true stronghold of Basque language and culture 
in Spain was to be found in the rural districts of Vizcaya and Guipuz-
coa, where the language was used as the vernacular by peasant farmers 
and coastal f'ishing populations. Yet Basque nationalism was launched 
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from an urban platform in 1894 and by urbanites, who were ignorant of the 
language and who had but a peripheral knowledge of traditional Basque cul-
ture. The founder of the movement, a young lawyer named Sabino Arana, 
learned the Basque language as an adult and then th~ough his writings, 
set about the task of purifying it of its foreign influences, that is, 
of its Spanish loan words. This exercise in linguistic purism only ser-
ved to deepen the gulf between the urban Basque nationalists and the 
native Basque speakers of rural areas. 
Sabino Arana launched his movement by penning a virulent attack 
upon Spanish institutions and Spaniards. He delighted in the fact that 
Spain was in the throes of losin~ most of her overseas possessions, and 
when Cuba fell to the American forces Arana was arrested for sending a 
congratulatory telegram to the president of the United States (Garcia 
Venero 1945: 251). In his book Bizkaya por su independencia7 Arana 
called for the outright independence of the Basques while decrying the 
evident process of Castilianization of the Basque country. Arana 
coined the new term Euzkadi to refer to an independent Basque nation. 
He advocated the expulsion of all French and Spanish from Basque soil. 
He coined pejorative terms to refer to non-Basques and laced his 
writings with a racist view that Spaniards were inferior beings while 
the Basques were the most ancient pure race remaining in Europe. He 
railed against intermarriage with non-Basques, a position that Miguel 
de Unamuno was to denounce as "absurd racial virginity" (Carr 1966:556). 
Arana struck a responsive chord among some sectors of the urban 
middle classes, students, and the Basque clergy. He was, however, 
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faced with a degree of apathy in the rural areas and with outright 
hostility from most Basque industrialists who feared government retal-
iations against the Basque country (Payne 1964: 411 ; Garcia Venero 
1945: 227, 251). Arana's personal career was both hectic and short-
lived. As the prime mover in the movement he would found a journal or 
a newspaper from time to time, publish a few issues ,and then suffer 
governmental censorship and, in some instances, imprisonment. Arana's 
activist following was always relatively small in numbers, but it is 
obvious that he was verbalizing the frustrations of a maj ori ty in 
Vizcaya for in 1898 he was elected as a representative to the provin-
cial government. He was to die shortly thereafter, a young man in his 
late thirties, broken by his numerous terms in prison; thus his follow-
ers had a ready-made candidate for elevation to the status of martyr 
(Basaldua 1953). 
While Sabino Arana provided the movement with its martyr, he also 
created its organization and programs. In 1893-1894 he laid the ground-
work f9r a new political force in the Basque country called the Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco or Basque Nationalist Party. About 1893 he wrote the 
principles of the party from a Vizcayan viewpoint and with the philo'-
sophy of Jaungoikua eta Lagi zarra ("God and old laws,,).8 
With the death of Sabino Arana in 1903 the formative stages of 
Basque nationalism were completed. From 1903 to 1921 the movement gained 
in strength and local political respectability, particular in Vizcaya 
where in 1918 the Basque Nationalist Party gained control of the 
Diputacion or provincial government. From the outset there was a 
polemic within the ranks of the nationalists concerning the degree to 
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which Basque separatism was an attainable or even desirable goal. A 
strong faction argued for agitation for return to the foral system of 
government within the Spanish nation. The nationalists also took a 
great deal of interest in international development in Europe and par-
ticularly the growing tendency to give the grievances of European 
ethnic minorities a serious airing. In 1916 the Basque nationalists 
sent a delegation to the Conference des Nationalites in Lausanne to 
press Basque political claims (Garcia Venero 1945: 284). This notion 
that the solution to the "Basque problem" might lie in developments 
on the wider European scene continues this day. Some present day nation-
alists view with hope federalist ideas such as the common market and 
the possible political unification of Europe. The idea is that tradi-
tional nations might be dissolved and membership in such a United Europe 
might be along ethnic lines, at which point Basques might press their 
claim of ethnic uniquness. 
During the first two decades of the twentieth century there was a 
notable cultural revival in the Basque country which, if it failed to 
jell into a significant literary movement (as was characteristic of 
cultural revitalization in Catalonia for example), nevertheless stimu-
lated renewed interest in Basque folklore, folk dancing, prehistory, 
and ethnology (Garcia Venero 1945: 279). The Basque nationalists spon-
sored numerous folk festivals, competitions between bertsolariak (rural 
bards), and athletic contests involving traditional Basque sporting 
events. In a different vein the movement sponsored serious scholarship 
(Garcia Venero 1945: 395-404), notably in the area of archeological 
excavations, the collection of folklore, Basque linguistics, the 
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ethnography of rural life, and the sociology of urbanization and social 
problems in the industrial zones. Scholarly journals such as La Revista 
Internacional de Estudios Vascos (1907) and Eusko-Folklore (1921) were 
founded. These efforts were to cUlminate in 1919 in the First Con~ress 
of Basque Studies (Primer Congreso 1919) sponsored by the Provincial 
Government. 
The power base of the Basque Nationalist Party was to remain urban 
but the message began to lean heavily upon the use of rural symbols as 
a means of invoking traditional values (Abrisqueta 1962). Since the 
rural areas were the last remaining strongholds of the Basque language 
and had undergone considerably less influx of non-Basque populations 
with attendant Castilianization, the nationalists laced their speeches 
wi th praise for the farming way of life and the supposed independent and 
honest character of the Basque farmer. The Basque baserria or farmstead 
was elevated to the status of bastion of Basque culture. The national-
ists also railed against the already discernible twentieth-century ten-
dency of peasants leaving the land, since such a movement threatened to 
destroy the last vestiges of Basque culture. With such an approach it 
is probably not surprising that the nationalists enjoyed little success 
in radicalizing the very people they purported to defend - the peasants 
(Garcia Venero 1945: 396). Nor is it too surprising that an urban 
nativist political movement would opt for rural symbolism. It might be 
argued that the brute facts of the effects of the urban environment upon 
maintenance of Basque culture had become too obvious for anyone to hope 
to reverse the trend. It might also be argued that the nationalists 
were in part simply verbalizing the frustrations of too rapid urbaniza-
tion, a kind of back to nature and traditional values reaction. 
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In any event the Basque Nationalist Party enjoyed some initial suc-
cesses before being forced underground in 1921 under the dictatorship of 
Primo de Rivera. With the new climate of political freedom that swept 
Spain with the advent of the Republic in 1931, the Basque Nationalist 
Party was able to surface on the national scene. A major development was 
the transfer of control within the party to its younger, more active mem-
bers. By 1931 the first generation of Basque nationalists created in 
the days of Sabino Arana had aged; and under the repression of Primo de 
Rivera many of its members had become disillusioned with attendant frag-
mentation of the movement. However, in 1931 a new dynamism emerged under 
the leadership of Jose Antonio Aguirre, a young twenty-seven-year-old 
lawyer, industrialist, and former president of the powerful youth organ-
ization Accion Catolica in -Vizcaya. 9 Aguirre and other young members of 
the leadership core successfully compaigned for election to the Spanish 
Cortes, or Parliament, in Madrid. If the first generation of Basque 
nationalists had laid the foundations for a Basque cultural revitalization 
and achieved local political gains, the second generation converted the 
movement into a serious and respectable factor in Spain's political life. 
It was also to constitute the leadership in the Basque provinces during 
the fateful months of 1936 when Spain embarked upon its most recent Civil 
War. 
By 1931 the Basque Nationalist Party had wrested control of the 
electorate in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa from the traditional Carlist party. 
The Basque delegates to the parliament in Madrid began to clamor for 
home rule. In June, 19-32 a congress was held in Pamplona to discuss 
adoption of a Statute of Autonomy. The Navarrese rejected the plan by 
a vote of 123 to 109 while the delegates of the other three provin-
ces adopted it. On November 11, 1932 the statute was approved by a 
plebiscite in the three provinces of Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya. 
The only province which they failed to carry was Navarra, which re-
mained Carlist in political orientation, although even there Basque 
nationalism was making great inroads (Toynbee 1937: 4o-4~; Peers 
1937: 112). 
The Republican government in Madrid, however, failed to act on 
the plebiscite despite the fact it had laready granted a Statute of 
Autonomy to Catalonia. Many Basque Nationalists believe that the 
Republican government, always suspicious of the Spanish church, dis-
trusted the Basques for their traditional clericalism. The Basques' 
demand for direct relations with the Vatican posed a maj or obstacle 
to granting of the statute. In any event the Spanish Civil War began 
in 1936 and the beleaguered Republican government hastily granted the 
Basques their autonomy. In October of that year Aguirre, then the 
leader of the Basque delegation to Madrid, was named president of the 
Basque government. Most of Navarra and Alava had already fallen to 
the forces of General Franco, but the provinces of Guipuzcoa and Viz-
caya prepared for war, fielded an army, issued passports and a currency, 
and sent out diplomatic missions to foreign countries. This first 
Basque government represented a coalition of political forces including 
Spanish Republicans, Socialists, and Communists, however, Basque nation-
alists held the key posts including the presidency. 
The effort was to be both painful and short-lived. The Basque army 
was outnumbered and under equipped, and the Basque provinces, along 
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with Asturias and Santander, were cut off from the remaining Republican-
held areas of Spain. Within nine months Basque resistance collapsed 
and the Basque government was in exile in Paris. Many thousands of 
Basques were either in prison camps or in exile. The aftermath of the 
Civil War was extremely difficult for the Basque country. An occupation 
army remained behind, all Basque language pUblications were prohibited, 
and it was made illegal to use the language in public. Persons with 
activist records in the Basque Nationalist Party were tried, some of 
them receiving prison sentences and others being executed. 10 Therefore, 
at the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War in 1939, those Basque nation-
alists remaining in Spain were either in prison or paralyzed through 
fear into inactivity. Thousands of nationalists were in exile in France 
and many were emigrating to join relatives in the Basque diaspora, 
notably in Latin America. The coalition Basque government continued to 
operate in Paris where it propagandized against the Franco regime. The 
Basque Nationalist Party was headquartered in the French Basque area 
where most if its efforts were directed toward assisting refugees to 
become established locally or to emigrate. Exiled Basque political 
leaders residing in Latin America directed their efforts to radicalizing 
local Basques. They enjoyed considerable success and were able to 
found anti-Franco political journals, notably in Buenos Aires, Caracas, 
Santiago de Chile, and Mexico City. 
A further blow to Basque nationalism came in the form of the Ger-
man invasion of France. Aguirre and other members of the Basque govern-
ment were forced to flee out of fear that the German authorities would 
extradite them to Spain. Thus during the Second World War most of the 
leadership in both the Basque government and the Basque Nationalist 
Party fled to Latin America. There they were to form nuclei of Basque 
resistance, notably in Buenos Aires, Caracas, and Mexico City, which 
began to propagandize against the Franco regime (and continue to do so 
to this day). Financing these activities did not prove to be overly 
difficult since the Basque community in Latin America constitutes a 
wealthy business elite, and many of the nouveau riche Basque business-
men were refugees who were financed by the Basque Nationalist Party. 
At the conclusion of the Second World War euphoria swept the 
movement, for Franco's days appeared to be numbered. In the eyes of 
the international community Franco was identified with Hitler and 
Mussolini. Spain was boycotted both politically and economically by 
the community of nations and exiled Spanish political groups gained 
new respectability since they would likely dictate the political future 
of the Spanish nation. The leadership of the Basque nationalists re-
turned to France and planned the details of their return to power. 
However, Franco proved to be considerably more resilient than was ex-
pected. He turned Spain in upon itself declaring that the nation would 
get along without the rest of the world. The years from 1945 to 1951 
were particularly difficult. Spain was still smarting from its terrible 
Civil War and the imposed economic and political isolation precluded 
Spain's participation in the Marshall Plan and frustrated most of its 
efforts at self help. 
In 1951 the optimism of the Basque nationalists was destroyed. 
The United States, pursuing a cold war policy of containment of commun-
ism, approached the Franco regime with a request for air bases. Franco 
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exacted in return diplomatic recognition and massive amounts of economic 
and military aid. The American pact spelled the beginning of the end of 
Spain's isolation. Recognition by the U. S. provided Franco with a 
modicum of international respectability; correspondingly, Spanish resist-
\ 
ance groups such as the Basque nationalists suffered a serious blow. 
These developments produced profound disillusionment among the 
Basque nationalists. The movement was no longer the heir apparent to 
poli tical authority in northern Spain, but ra.ther was relegated over-
night to the status of an unrealistic, outlawed utopian dream. At the 
same time the aging process in the leadership ranks became apparent. 
The second generation of Basque nationalists, accustomed to exercising 
real political power during the Spanish Republic and the few months of 
Euzkadi's existence, now found themselves in the position of initiating 
anew the process of politicization at the grass roots level--a task that 
would have t .o be carried out in the face of almost impossible odds. What's 
more, the leadership had become increasingly conservative and more given 
to moderation in its actions. Its financia.l support was also derived al-
most exclusively from businessmen and professional persons who were am-
bivalent on the issue of total commitment to revolutionary activities. 
The decade of the 1950s was therefore characterized by decay and indecis-
iveness in the leadership ranks. Some died (Aguirre himself died in 1960) 
and others simply withdrew from what they regarded, with much bitterness, 
to be a lost cause. At the same time the seeds of schism were blooming 
within the ranks of the Nationalists. By 1954 the leaders of the Basque 
Nationalist Party were concerned with revitalization of its youth group 
or Eusko Gaztedi (Basque Youth) known as EGI. Young persons were en-
couraged to become involved in propagandizing by distributing clandestine 
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literature, surreptitiously writing slogans on walls, and placing 
Basque flags throughout the Spanish Basque area. The first sign of 
schism appeared when a faction of EGI rejected this moderate course 
of action in favor of a hard-line approach. This group founded a new 
organization known as ETA (Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna, or Euzkadi and Free-
dom) which was openly separatist and which announced through its lit-
erature that violence on the part of the Franco regime would be met 
by violence. 
Until the early part of the 1960s, ETA was considerably less 
activist that its platform promised. The new movement was an anathema 
for the Basque Nationalist Party which continued to monopolize the 
sources of financial support for Basque nationalism. ETA became in-
creasingly desperate and initiated a series of robberies in the Spanish 
Basque provinces. It also tried to intimidate some of the contribu-
tors to the Basque Nationalist Party. The early 1960s also witnessed 
the beginning of ETA terrorism in the form of bombings which were care-
fully planned as warnings that would not take human lives. 
The early 1960s were also characterized by a parallel, but largely 
independent, acceleration of resistance among Basque clergymen. In 
part encouraged by a growing concern within the Catholic Church for 
strong stands on the issue of human rights, the young clergymen in 
Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa began to confront their bishops (whose appoint-
ments must be approved by the Franco government and hence are subjected 
to political considerations), and engaged in public denunciations of 
what they regarded as the perpetration of cultural genocide against 
th ' , h' 11 elr parls loners. 
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In 1960, 339 Basque priests signed a document of protest calling 
for a papal investigation of the Basque question. In many respects the 
challenge from the clergy was a more serious problem for Franco than 
that of the Basque political organizations. Good relations with the 
Spanish Church. and the Vatican constitute one of the keystones of the 
policy of the Franco regime. In return for Church support Franco makes 
a number of concessions including paying the salaries of Spanish 
priests and allowing the Church disciplinary control over its clergy. 
Consequently, the vociferous priests had to be treated circumspectly 
and were in a position to take public stands that were unthinkable for 
the most ardent Basque nationalist layman. 
The decade of the 1960s was therefore characterized by an accele-
ration of Basque resistance on two fronts--the civil and clerical. On 
the civil front the ETA organization increased its activities, notably 
armed holdups and bombings to the point that by the mid-1960s it had 
the strongest claim to leadership of Basque nationalist activism. 
By 1967 the first nonwartime deaths plagued Basque nationalism. ETA 
members and Spanish police were dying in gun battles. In 1968, ETA ass-
assinated Meliton Manzanas, the chief of police of the province of Guipuz-
coa. The response from Madrid was imposition of martial law in Guipuzcoa. 
This was quickly extended to Vizcaya. The police rounded up hundreds of 
suspects including many dissident clergymen. The Basque country was awash 
with rumors and accusations of police brutality and tortures. Convicted 
members of ETA received long prison sentences with the prosecution asking 
for the death penalty in some cases. 
Throughout the 1960s the rift between the ETA and the Basque 
Nationalist Party deepened. For ETA activists the leadership of both the 
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Basque Nationalist Party and Basque government-in-exile had grown old 
and were locked into a kind of marriage of convenience with the Franco 
regime. That is, in return for a measure of tolerance of their propa-
ganda acti vi ties, the leadership of the established Basque Nationalist 
Party and Basque government-in-exile eschewed day-to-day violence as a 
legitimate means of attaining its goals while at the same time hedging 
on the question of total separatism. Conversely, the leaderships of 
these more established Basque nationalist entities viewed ETA as an up-
start whose activities were both immature and ill-timed. The greatest 
fear in the Basque Nationalist Party circles was that ETA would bring 
down the full force of the Franco regime upon the Basque provinces, or, 
by virtue of committing atrocities, it would alienate the Basque masses 
from the cause of Basque nationalism, or both. 
To further exacerbate the division, the ETA movement turned sharp-
ly to the left of the political spectrum. Its propaganda became in-
creasingly laced with the notion that the free Basque state of Euzkadi 
should be established upon Marxist-Leninist principles. 12 The incompat-
ibility between such a platform and the articles of political doctrine 
formulated by Sabino Arana (See Note 8) is obvious. In point of fact, 
the ETA movement has itself been splintered into at least two factions 
on the issue of whether the primary goal is Basque nationalism as a 
narrowly defined local issue or Basque nationalism as a facet of the 
wider struggle of the oppressed peoples of the world--i.e. Basque nation-
alism as part of an international movement. 
While the ideological division between ETA and the more traditional 
elements of the Basque Nationalist movement are largely irreconcilable, 
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curiously this had not loomed as the major bone of contention between 
them. Rather the major issue remains disagreement over the question 
of tactics. The difference lies at the level of a distinction between 
heart and mind, emotions and intellect. Whereas ETA, through its act-
ivities, mobilizes and vindicates a play upon Basque nationalist emotion-
alism, the Basque Nationalist Party and Basque government-in-exile, 
through their caution, are better able to engage in political pragmatism. 
The issue is thus one of patience. ETA, organized as a kind of hyper-
secret terrorist organization which surely numbers but a few hundred 
members, strikes out immediately against perceived injustices of the day; 
however, its long range program and political goals remain obfuscated by 
lack of organization and clearly defined platform. The Basque National-
ist Party, on the other hand, counsels patience and is willing to let the 
present imbalance of justice go unredressed in the interest of achieving 
the long range goal of a return to power in the Basque country. Conse-
quently, the Basque Nationalist Party concentrates upon organization, 
and its membership numbers many thousands both in and out of Spain. The 
party leaders remain impressed with t4e odds agains the success of 
Basque nationalism and hence cautions that any attempt at a final push to 
overthrow Spanish hegemony in the Basque country must be made only at a 
time when there are other propitious events within the political life of 
the Spanish nation. The classic example remains, of course, the exper-
iences of 1936 when the Basque nationalists swept into power on the 
coattails of the Spanish Civil War. The point to be made is that there 
is no real difference between ETA and the Basque Nationalist Party con-
cerning the legitimacy of the use of violence. Rather the difference lies 
in the perception of the pragmati cs of resorting to violence. ETA 
employs violence as a daily tool of intimidation, the Basque Nation-
alist Party views violence as a one-shot means of regaining power--
a shot which should only be fired when the chances of success are much 
greater than at present. 
The division over tactics is best exemplified in the dilemma of 
the 1960s for EGI, the youth organization of the Basque Nationalist 
Party. As we have seen, ETA was born through a schism in EGI. As 
ETA became increasingly activist, EGI was torn between the appeal that 
activism seems to hold for the young and its continued adherence to 
the goals of the Basque Nationalist Party. Thus, due to the challenge 
and appeal of ETA activism, the 1960s have witnessed an acceleration 
in EGI activism. The Basque Nationalist Party, while not particularly 
happy with the situation, has had to Underwrite acceleration of EGI 
activities, if for no other reason than to stem the tide of possible 
defections among the ranks of its younger members. The fact that this 
increase in EGI activism coincides with a general aging in the leader-
ship generation (the generation of 1931) of the Basque Nationalist 
Party, suggests that the Party is likely to play an increasingly act-
ivist role in the future. 
The disagreement between ETA and the Basque Nationalist Party 
(with its youth group EGI) has led to overt competition. All three 
groups publish and distribute their own clandestine literature and 
maintain autonomous leadership structures. For many years the Basque 
Nationalist Party has sponsored an annual peaceful demonstration at 
different locations in the Basque country. This manifestation is 
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called Aberri Eguna or Day of the Nation. In 1966 when the Party 
announced that Aberri Eguna would be held in Vitoria (Alava), ETA 
promptly called for its own Aberri Eguna in Irun (Guipuzcoa). 
However, one might posit that aside from their disagreements there 
remains a modicum of common purpose, or at least a relationship of mutual 
convenience, between ETA and the Basque Nationalist Party. There is a 
certain ambivalence detectable in the Party's condemnation of ETA act-
ivism, since ETA's blows are directed at the common enemy. Conversely, 
it is unlikely that ETA could have survived if it were not for the many 
years of effort by the Basque Nationalist Party. We might say that ETA 
is reworking ground already broken by the Basque Nationalist Party. If 
Basque nationalism were an entirely new idea, the extremist tactics of 
ETA would likely have pr,oven to be too radical for the Basque public. 
Finally, both groups are fully aware that Basque nationalists are a 
minority in a region which percentagewise is but a small part of the 
whole of the Spanish nation. Consequently, regardless of ideological 
and tactical differences, at one level each Basque nationalist faction 
welcomes the existence of other groups of Basque resistance. 
The second front of Basque resistance during the1960s was the 
clergy. Th~ 1960 document of protest signed by 339 priests and sent to 
the Vatican demonstrated clearly the deep sense of dissatisfaction felt 
by Basque clergymen in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. It may be suspected that 
many more clergymen who failed to sign the document were nevertheless 
in sympathy with its points. The document was signed by young and el-
derly clergymen alike, and the leaders behind the document were largely 
middle-aged priests. This point is significant since, as we shall see, 
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it provides the basis for discerning a striking parallel with develop-
ments in the secular movements. The priests who led this early movement 
had witnessed the creation of Euskadi in 1936, many served as chaplains 
in the Basque army, and some had suffered incarceration after the war. 
Thus, when the 1960 document was formulated, clerical support of Basque 
nationalism was not an entirely new element upon the scene. However, 
it should be noted that the generation of Basque clergymen who lived 
through the Spanish Civil War were always extremely guarded about pro-
viding official support for the Basque government or Basque lI"1tionalist 
Party. Accusations to the contrary, the priests were never involved 
directly in the Basque Nationalist Party, nor did they, as a group, take 
stands on political matters regardless of the personal predilections of 
each. The Basque Nationalist Party itself refuses to admit priests as 
members. Any public support of the nationalists took the form of moral-
izing about their human rights rather than commenting upon their poli-
tical goals. 
The 1960 document cast down the gauntlet before both Franco and 
the Basque church hierarchy. In the early 1960s the clergy, young and 
old alike, acted in concert and challenged both the Basque bishops and 
the State, but the attacks remained strictly on a plane of defense of 
human rights. By the mid-1960s however, the young clergy was out-
stripping the elder generation in vociferousness and stubbornness. At 
first hesitantly and then with growing determination the government 
began to detain and jail activist priests. At the same time, young 
priests became more identified with secular political groups, and 
rumors increased to the effect that young priests were helping fugitive 
members of ETA escape into France. The young priests openly confronted 
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the bishops with hunger strikes, demonstrations, and sermons. Proposals 
such as turning in mass resignations or group travel to Rome to picket 
the Vatican were given serious consideration. The radical activism of 
the young clergy, and the accelerating response on the part of the 
Franco government combined to produce a schism in the ranks of Basque 
nationalist-oriented clergy analogous to that between ETA and the 
Basque Nationalist Party. As with the secular resistance groups, the 
division amongst the clergy turned upon the question of tactics. As 
with the seculars, persons on different sides of the split were ambi-
valent towards one another, rather than openly hostile. 
In any event, the Franco regime has ceased to brook open opposi-
tioh from the clergy. It has obviously decided to risk straining re-
lations with the Vatican since priests are arrested for such things as 
ill-advised comments in Sunday sermons. Arrested priests are frequent-
ly tried by military tribunals and there is a new priests' wing at the 
prison of Zamora. 
As with most historical movements, the closer one gets to the 
present the more difficult it is to discern patterning and direction in 
the course of events. It is fair to state that the future course of 
political history in the Basque country is far from clear at present. 
This statement holds true for the Spanish governmental officials who 
are faced with the task of rooting out a political ideal which is 
flourishing in its home soil. Equally, it holds for the Basque nation-
alists who recognize the tremendous odds against the movement, who have 
enj oyed considerable recent successes in radicalizing the populace, 
but who in the process have exhausted the probable efficacy of peaceful 
means of resistance. One thing is clear, the past ten years have 
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witnessed a new commitment on the part of the Spanish government to 
extricate the Basque problem from the national political life. At 
the same time it has been a decade of expansion and growth of Basque 
nationalism accompanied by factioning which has produced some nation-
alist groups dedicated to terrorism. The recent trial in Burgos must 
be regarded as a defeat for those (on both sides) who advocate a 
peaceful solution to the Basque question. The fact that a trial of 
Basque terrorists could undermine the international respectability of 
the Franco regime and tilt Spanish domestic affairs in the direction 
of political chaos is a clear moral victory. for ETA. In retrospect 
the trial may have transferred the mantle of leadership of Basque re-
sistance from the more moderate Basque Nationalist Party to ETA. If 
this is the case the Basque resistance forces are likely to up the 
ante of violence. 
Some Implications 
The fundamental importance of ethnic nationalism is acclaimed by 
the recent proliferation of separatist movements throughout much of the 
13 
world. In many of the developing nations of Asia and Africa the 
euphoria that accompanied the demise of colonialism and the political 
optimism that characterized the creation of new nations have recently 
been deflated by the resurgence and accentuation of tribal or ethnic 
differences. Since, in the words of Lucian Pye, (1967: 183) "political 
scientists were intellectually ill-prepared for the collapse of empires 
and the formation of new states." scholars began to take another look at 
the process of nation-building in Europe thus hoping to get a better 
perspective with which to dissect the problems associated with nation-
building in the new states. Many of these studies were both of a 
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descriptive and prescriptive nature. In devising models of the inte-
grated political system, and drawing on the European experiences, 
students of political development hoped to be able to abstract some guide 
lines which would assist the political leaders of the developing societies 
to implement integrative policies. 
However, it is equally apparent that ethnic nationalism is not re-
stricted solely to "immature" political systems. With very few except-
ions, nations are ethnically hetereogenous and few have been totally 
immune from political demands pressed by one or more ethnic groups en-
claved within the national life. Groups (or at least segments within 
groups) such as the Welsh, Scots, Bretons, Flemish, and Basques include 
the desire for political autonomy in their platforms. The claims of 
French Canadians, Chicanos, Red Power advocates, some American Jews and 
certain Black Americans demonstrate that the political life of North 
America is likewise effected by ethnic nationalism. 
We would not presume, in the limited context of the present art-
icle, to assail or even discuss the entire literature on political de-
velopment and nation-building. However, we do believe that the case 
study of Basque nationalism may be instructive for political scientists, 
particularly those theorizing about political development in nation-
building, who assume (either explicitly or implicitly) that ethnic 
nationalism is like to occur when: 
1) an ethnic group occupies a position of economic deprivation 
within a nation, and 
2) when such an ethnic group is isolated either physically or 
conceptually from the mainstream of the national life. 
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Characterist,ic of this school of thought is that economic devel-
opment and technological changes will ultimately eliminate sectional 
and/or ethnic differences. Improved communications and, particularly 
the greater use of mass media are seen as creating, over time, a 
single national pl.:trpose among groups whose interests were traclition-
ally divergent. Thus Pye (1963: 10) states, "the widely recognized 
problem of creating political concensus in most of the new states, is 
in part one of building new and more universal means of national com-
munications, of establishing more effective channels of communications 
and transportation so that all segments of the society can become more 
closely involved. vrith each other." Coleman (1960: 345) notes, "the 
problem of integration and building concensus in African territorial 
political systems is largely a problem of developing patterns of c9m-
munications." While Deutsch (1966: 99) maintains that [what countsL 
"is not the absence or presence of any particular variables, but the 
presence of sufficient communications facilities." "When several 
populations clusters are united through intervening settlements or 
through more communications and more economic activity ... then people 
begin to think of themselves as a country" (Deutsch 1969: 6). 
In the case of the Basques, however, despite several centuries 
of efforts by Madrid and Paris to exert their centralist authority, 
a modern ethnic nationalism movement emerged near the turn of the 
present century. In the Spanish Basque instance the movement made 
its appearance among an economically privileged group (the Basque 
country has enjoyed the highest per capita income of Spain throughout 
most of the twentieth century). Furthermore, the economy of the Basque 
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area is integrated almost totally into Spanish economic life. The major-
ity of Basque products are marketed elsewhere in Iberia and Basque in-
dustries are dependent for their labor supply upon extensive in-migration 
from other areas of Spain. The development of the modern Basque national-
ist movement has transpired precisely during a period characterized by a 
veritable revolution in the use of communications and mass media. Today 
the movement is gaining in strength despite the fact that even in the 
most isolated Basque villages the radio and television set are commonplace 
and programming is dominated by a carefully censored centralist political 
viewpoint. Formal education at the primary school level is mandatory in 
every Basque village and the curriculum is under the direct control of 
Madrid. Similarly, it is impossible to argue that Basque nationalism is 
the product of ethnic group particularistic values. The movement has 
drawn its leaders from the educated urban classes and clergy, persons who 
by virtue of their intellectual formation should be precisely the most 
likely to have a cosmopolitan world view and hold universalistic values. 
In conclusion, we would not deny that further industrialization, 
in-migration of non-Basques into the Basque area, and the diffusion of 
mass media pose serious challenges to the future viability of the Basque 
Nationalist movement. Basque Nationalists themselves underscore this 
point when they occasionally blow up the transmitter which brings Spanish 
National Television to their region. However, we would suggest that the 
Basque case (and possibly the cases of other nationalistically inclined 
ethnic groups enclaved within the Atlantic community of modern nations) 
cast doubt upon the contention that an efficient system of internal 
communications is an automatic guarantor of political integration. 
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NOTES 
IThe population of this area includes a substantial number of 
people who are not Basques, people who have immigrated from other areas 
of Spain. The exact figures on the number of Basques are difficult to 
come by since both the Spanish or French governments do not make any 
distinctions in their census figures. 
2For a statistical comparison of the Spanish regions see, Linz 
(1966) . 
3For a recent discussion of this problem consult Enbata, January 
1964. This is ~ journal of the French Basque nationalist group. 
4For more historical information see Gallop (1930b: 495), Ormond 
(1925), and Ortueta (1963). 
5For a discussion of the Carlist Wars and the ideological basis 
of Carlismo see, Carr (1966: 155-196), Herrero (1956), and Schumacher 
(1962: 343-364). 
6The extent of industrial development in the Basque region is 
illustrated by the following figures: in 1877 Spain was producing 
1.58 million tons of iron ore, 1.04 million tons of which were pro-
d~ced in the province of Vizcaya, By 1900 Spain was producing 21.5% 
of the world's output of iron-ore. Of Spain's 252 iron-ore mines, 106 
were concentrated in Vizcaya and over 75% of the nation's miners 
worked in Vizcaya. By the turn of the century the Bilbao complex was 
the leading producer of steel in Spain (Chilcote 1968). During the 
same period, Basque financial interests grew to the point where Basque 
bankers became the single most important financial interest in Spain 
(Carr 1966: 435). 
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7The complete writings of Sabino Arana are available in the re-
cently published Obras Completas (1966). 
8The platform of the party was expressed in thirteen articles as 
follows: 
Article 1 -- Bizkaya, upon entering a Republican confederacy, does so 
according to the acceptance of the political doctrine expounded by 
Arana Goiri'tar Sabino [Sabino Arana y Goiri] in the slogan Jaungoikua 
eta Lagi Zarra, which is explained in the following articles. 
Article 2 -- Jaun-Goikua-Bizkaya will be Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman 
in all aspects of its internal affairs and its relations with other 
peoples. 
Article 3 -- Lagi-Zarra-Bizkaya will be freely reconstituted. It will 
reestablish, with complete integrity, the essence of its traditional 
laws, called Fueros. It will restore the good practices and customs 
of its predecessors. It will be constituted, if not exclusively, then 
principally, of families of the Basque race. It will establish Basque 
as its official language. 
Article 4 -- ETA-Bizkaya will be established upon perfect harmony and 
accord between the religious and political orders, between the divine 
and the human. 
Article 5 -- Distinction between Jaun-Goikua and Lagi Zarra Bizkaya will 
be established with a clear and marked distinction between the religious 
and political orders, between the ecclesiastical and civil. 
Article 6 -- Precedence of Jaun Goikua over Lagi Zarra Bizkaya will be 
established with a complete and unconditional subordination of the 
political to the religious; of the State to the Church. 
Article 7 Confederation -- Since Bizkaya is by race, language, faith, 
character and custom a sister of Alava, Benabarra [Basse Navarre] , 
Guipuzcoa, Laburdi [Labourd], Navarra and Zuberoa [Soule], it will be-
come allied or confederated with these six peoples to form a whole 
called, Euskalerria, but without surrendering its particular autonomy. 
This doctrine will be expressed in the following principle: Bizkaya 
li bre en Euskalerria libre [Free Bizkaya in a Free Basque Country]. 
Article 8 -- The Basque confederation will be formed by all of the 
Basque states with each entering willingly and with all having the same 
rights in the formation of its [the confederation's] foundations. 
Article 9 -- The necessary bases for a solid and durable national unity 
are: unity of race as far as is possible, and Catholic unity. 
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Article 10 -- The essential bases to insure that the Basque states 
entering the union will retain equal autonomy and identical faculties 
are: freedom to secede, and equality of obligations and rights within 
the Confederation. 
Article 11 -- Once the Confederation is established each member state 
will have the same rights and identical obligations. 
Article 12 -- The Confederation will unite its members solely in terms 
of the social order and international relations, in all other respects 
each will maintain its traditional absolute independence. 
Article 13 -- All of the articles in this document and political doc-
trine are irrevocable. 
(Quoted in Garcia Venero 1945: 244-245) 
Article 9 reflects the nationalist's dilemma that much of the 
population of the Basque country, including many ardent nationalists, 
possessed shaky geneological claims to Basque descent. This fact 
lends substance to the somewhat jocular criticism that in order to be 
a confirmed Basque nationalist one must possess at lease one non-Basque 
last name or be ignorant of the Basque language! 
9 For biological material on Aguirre see, Basaldua (1956). For 
Aguirre's views on Basque nationalism and his experiences during the 
Civil War, see, Aguirre (n.d.; 1943). 
10 For the treatment of the Basque clergy by the Franco regime 
see Le clerge Basque (1938), author anonymous. 
11 In a letter sent to Pope Paul in 1968, a group of Basque priests 
dramatically appealed to the Pope by maintaining that the Basques were 
an oppressed minority whose culture was being destroyed by both the 
Madrid and Paris governments. See Anon. (1968). 
12 ETA publishes an undergound paper, Zutik, in which the views 
of the party are publicized. 
13 For a broad discussion of separatist movements see, Connor (1967). 
For case studies of separatist movements in Southeast Asia, Wales, 
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Scotland, Brittany, Quebec, and Africa, consult Connor (1968), Davies 
(1968), Schwartz (1970), Hayward (1969), Wilson (1967), Hargrove (1970), 
Mazrui (1969), and Hanna (1969). For a more theoretical discussion on 
the question of ethnicity and ethnic conflict, see Melson and Wolpe 
(1970) and Horowitz (n.d.). 
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